Five war scenarios: what to expect on the front lines in 2025 and the potential for negotiations with Russia.

Five Scenarios of War: What to Expect on the Frontlines in 2025 and Are Negotiations with Russia Possible?

For over a year, Russia has been conducting an offensive campaign on the front. Meanwhile, Western leaders are increasingly calling for negotiations and an end to the war. The newly elected U.S. president stated even before his inauguration that he could facilitate this.

What will happen with the war in 2025 is covered in detail by military and political analyst RBK-Ukraine.

The war in 2024 unfolded unfavorably for Ukraine. Delays in support from its main ally – the United States – along with problems directly within the troops have prevented Ukraine from resisting Russian pressure. Moscow has been conducting an offensive operation for over a year and is achieving gradual advances.

Statements from Western leaders and representatives of our government suggest, either directly or indirectly, that the war may be closer to a climax than ever before – perhaps it has already begun. However, it may not be the kind of climax many of us expected in 2022 or even in 2023.

What to Expect in the Coming Months

Russia is currently focusing its efforts on capturing the southern part of the Donetsk region – an area where occupying forces achieved their most significant breakthrough in a year and a half after seizing Avdiivka. The heaviest fighting is taking place in the vicinity of Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove.

The first is where Ukrainian forces advanced during the counteroffensive in 2023, and it is now semi-surrounded. North of Velyka Novosilka, the Russians have cut off two roads leading from the city. To the south, the occupiers have regained control over parts of settlements along the Mokri Yaly River, which Ukrainian forces liberated in 2023. Meanwhile, our units defending in the village of Makarivka are now at risk of encirclement.

Kurakhove – a crucial defense hub for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the southern Donetsk region – is almost under the aggressor's control, with the exception of the territory of the Kurakhivska TPP. The situation is also dire to its south, in the so-called Kurakhove "pocket."

If Kurakhove is captured, the enemy's focus will likely shift toward Pokrovsk. The nearest enemy positions to this city are just six kilometers to the south and east. In the coming months, the occupiers are expected to concentrate on approaching this city from the north, from the Grodivka area, and possibly from the southwest, creating conditions for a semi-encirclement of the city. Only after this will the Russians move on to frontal assaults.

Two other challenging areas are the regions of Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, where fighting has been ongoing for several months. The capture of these two cities fits into the enemy's plan to occupy the northern part of the Donetsk region. Should Toretsk and Chasiv Yar be occupied, these two enemy groupings will aim for Konstantynivka and subsequently for the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. However, the operation to seize this area is still in its early stages.

To occupy this agglomeration, the Russians need to "resolve" several complex tasks to the north of it. The first task is to capture the entire left bank of the Oskil River in the Kupiansk direction, from where the enemy could advance south along the river while having a protected flank. A month ago, the enemy broke through to the banks of the Oskil, but they have not been able to expand this incursion due to counterattacks from our troops since then.

The second unresolved task for the aggressor is to capture a foothold near Sviatohirsk and Lyman, from where they intended to advance on Sloviansk in 2022 but lost control during our counteroffensive in the fall of that year. The third obstacle for the Russians is the existence of our Severodonetsk bulge, which can still be considered the most stable section of the front, although enemy attacks have recently intensified there. This means that the battles for the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration do not appear to be an imminent prospect.

An additional foothold experiencing intense fighting is in the Kursk region. Russian and North Korean troops are attacking this area from various directions: from the northwest, northeast, and southeast. North Korean soldiers have managed to approach Mala Loknia and break into Plekhovo, a feat that Russian units had previously been unable to achieve. Overall, according to the publication, our military currently controls 45% of the territory they held at their peak. The final deadline set by the Kremlin for the complete expulsion of the Ukrainian army is March 1.

Two other threatening areas remain in southern Ukraine. Several informed sources from the publication confirmed that Moscow has not abandoned its plans to launch an offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region and advance on Kherson. Moreover, they stated that the enemy's readiness to launch an offensive on the right bank of Kherson is higher than for activity in Zaporizhzhia.

Our military expects that the main blow here may fall on the area of Piatykhatky parallel to the Dnipro – this is the enemy's "Dnipro" operational group’s area of responsibility. However, they do not rule out enemy actions near Huliaipole. As for Kherson, which also falls under the "Dnipro" operational group, the occupiers have already attempted to initiate actions toward the right bank of the Dnipro. The latest attempt was last week when Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups tried to break through to the Antonivskyi Bridge from the side of Oleshky. These attempts were repelled.

Sources for the publication indicate that the decision to launch offensive actions in Kherson has already been made. This operation will be overseen by the commander of the Russian airborne troops, Mikhail Teplinsky. According to RBK-Ukraine, around 4,000 stormtroopers may be involved in the offensive actions, including the 61st Separate Marine Brigade of the Russian Federation, as well as airborne units, such as the 7th Air Assault Division of the Airborne Forces. It is symbolic that it was airborne troops who retreated from Kherson in the fall of 2022. At the same time, there may be two directions of attack: one to the north, near Nova Kakhovka, and the other to the south of Kherson.

The start of active actions by the occupiers directly depends on the weather and the success of Russia's actions in the Kursk region. To move toward Kherson, the occupiers must cross the Dnipro River in one way or another. There are no surviving bridges there. This means that they will have to cross this river using boats or by establishing crossings. However, in certain sections of the Dnipro, after the aggressor blew up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station, a continuous swamp formed, which freezes in cold weather, facilitating passage. This is also known to the enemy.

Secondly, some airborne units from the "Dnipro" operational group have been redeployed to assist Russian units in the Kursk region and have not yet returned. Sources for the publication, however, doubt the success of Moscow's plans, considering the complexity of such an operation and the fact that the occupiers are already prepared to meet them on the right bank.

Five Scenarios for the War in 2025

The current plan of Russia is to advance wherever possible. Ukraine, for both objective and subjective reasons, is unable to stop the enemy's pace or seize the initiative on the front. And so far, all trends indicate that we are unlikely to turn the situation in our favor in the near future.

Most, if not all, Western leaders seem to doubt the possibility of reclaiming all our territories through military means and are increasingly calling for peaceful negotiations with Russia. This idea is clearly articulated by Donald Trump and his team at the forefront. In reality, the future of the war now primarily lies in the hands of the United States. And although no clear strategy for ending hostilities has yet emerged from the U.S., there is no doubt that immediately after the inauguration, the new White House team will actively engage in the "peace process."

Ukrainian authorities have already begun to cautiously speak about the impossibility of reclaiming all occupied territories through force. The question of continuing the war until reaching the legitimate Ukrainian borders of 1991 has disappeared from their public rhetoric.

Similarly, cautious statements about readiness for negotiations have begun to emerge from Ukrainian officials. At the very least, following a conversation with Ukrainian President Donald Trump stated that Volodymyr Zelensky is ready to conclude an agreement to end the war. It can be assumed that this implies agreement to certain compromises, considering that Ukraine currently holds far from the best positions. The specifics of these compromises will be determined directly during negotiations. Zelensky, in turn, after meeting with Trump, stated that Ukraine needs a just peace and strong security guarantees that would prevent Russia from returning to war.

Three other significant factors remain uncertain – first, what security guarantees Ukraine could receive in the event of a cessation of hostilities. Second, is Russia willing to negotiate? The White