"You are expendable for Russia." How the FSB recruits "saboteurs" in the TCK and what lies ahead for terrorists.

Since the beginning of the year, there have already been nine acts of sabotage in military recruitment centers and police departments in Ukraine. What motivates the terrorists, how they are recruited by Russian special services, and what ultimately happens to them is covered in this report by RBC-Ukraine journalist Yulia Akimova.

While the Russian army attempts to occupy more and more Ukrainian cities, Russian special services are "active" in the information space, undermining the situation within the country. Propaganda, streams of disinformation, fake news, and IPSO are some of the areas of work for both the FSB and the Kremlin itself.

The second area is recruitment. Employees of the federal service and the enemy's main intelligence directorate find Ukrainians willing to work for Russia's interests and offer monetary compensation for carrying out tasks. These tasks can range widely – from posting notices with statements like "everything is lost, it's time to surrender," to assassinating police officers and military personnel.

Recently, there has been a significant increase in news about sabotage in military recruitment centers and police departments. Law enforcement officials link this to the fact that the Russians have reached another peak, taking advantage of the unstable sentiments within Ukraine, the failed mobilization, and the general dissatisfaction with the work of territorial recruitment centers. In this context, the terrorist acts are being framed as acts of defiance and rebellions "against the system" that forces people to fight.

"Rebellion" orchestrated by Russian special services

On February 1 at 16:15, a young blond-haired man entered the military recruitment center in the city of Rivne. He stopped on the first floor and was about to leave his backpack, which he held in his left hand, on the floor when it suddenly exploded. The explosives, packed with small metal fragments, scattered throughout the room, shattering windows and doors and injuring six military personnel. The bomber himself was left without legs and fingers on his left hand.

It later turned out that the young man was 24 years old, from the Zhytomyr region, looking for easy money, and agreed to carry out a "task." He was unaware that the Russian special services intended to detonate the device along with him.

A few weeks prior, on January 19 in Zhytomyr, a call was made to emergency line 102 – a male voice reported that explosives were hidden in an apartment at a specific address. Police arrived at the scene and found a blue bag and a yellow plush duck. The explosives were concealed within the soft toy. Later, police established that the device had been "sewn" into the plush duck by two boys, both born in 2005. Their motivation? Money.

At the end of last year, the Kyiv police received a call reporting that a woman was being beaten in one of the apartments in the Pechersk district. The police arrived, opened the door, and at the last moment noticed a tripwire. Miraculously, the grenade explosion did not harm them. A camera, which had been set up in advance, captured the events in the corridor.

On February 3 in Rivne, two young men attempted to bring explosives into the police building. SBU officers detained them right on the street and quickly neutralized the device that the boys had placed in a box. The explosives were also remote-controlled, as in the first case, so likely the two 21-year-old "Russian agents" faced the same fate as the young man from the Rivne military recruitment center. Now they await trial and face up to 15 years in prison for their failed terrorist act.

Since the beginning of the year, which is just over a month and a week, law enforcement has already registered nine terrorist acts – the recruited individuals primarily attempt to kill police officers or military personnel from the recruitment centers. The latest incident occurred on February 5 in Kamianets-Podilskyi, where a young man attempted to deliver a bag containing explosives to the military enlistment office, but detonated it himself and died. All those who carried out similar terrorist acts have been identified and detained, according to SBU Deputy Head Serhiy Andrushchenko.

"So far, there has not been a single case where we did not find the perpetrator. Starting from 2024, together with the National Police, we have identified 497 individuals who committed crimes. This includes those who set cars on fire, carried out sabotage on "Ukrzaliznytsia," and installed homemade explosive devices. It also includes those who attempted to take the lives of military personnel and employees of the Internal Affairs Ministry, committing terrorist acts. We detain them on hot trails," Andrushchenko stated.

A new wave of sabotage began last year with the arson of military and volunteer vehicles. Police and SBU officers apprehended Russian agents, who were often repeat offenders, drug addicts, or a combination of both. The motivation was simple and clear – money. Today, however, the profile of a "terrorist" recruited by the FSB is somewhat different.

Profile of a bomber

"The special services find the least media-savvy individuals and those in need of quick cash. This primarily includes youth, teenagers, and those living in their information bubble," explained Andriy Kovalенко, head of the Center for Counteracting Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) in a comment to RBC-Ukraine.

When observing how another terrorist act is portrayed in the Russian media space, which, unfortunately, still closely intertwines with the Ukrainian one, it creates the impression that each individual act of sabotage is almost an act of revenge. The bombing in the military recruitment center is presented as resistance from those unwilling to be mobilized. They are depicted as fighters against the regime, rebels standing against the system. In this context, the tragedy involving the murder of a military personnel member at the recruitment center in Pyriatyn played into the Kremlin's hands.

However, the actual situation with sabotage appears somewhat different, with the age of the bombers playing a crucial role. In Ukraine, citizens are mobilized starting from the age of 25. Yet, the overwhelming majority of Russian "agents" are under 24. This was noted by Ukrainian Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko.

"We conducted an analysis and have a profile of the individuals who most frequently commit such crimes. The key factor is age. Typically, these are young individuals, teenagers, and very young people under the age of 22-23. Russian special services attract them with advertisements for easy side jobs," Klymenko stated in a comment to RBC-Ukraine.

This fact, at the very least, nullifies Russian narratives about strong resistance to mobilization that leads to extreme measures. Undoubtedly, there are issues with mobilization in Ukraine, strained relations with military enlistment offices, and police. However, the bombings in military recruitment centers are not the result of this tension, as those who carry out these bombings are not involved in any mobilization activities. More often than not, they are young guys barely out of their teenage years. They either need money or are guided by their own, often inexplicable logic.

"Among them are individuals who may be part of certain Russian groups, so-called 'antifa.' They may resemble a person suspected of killing Iryna Faryon. For them, it’s an adventure, especially with the added incentive of payment. They believe they are above the war, that the war is a political story, while they have a grand mission. Such individuals exist among the youth. Subcultures exist for the purpose of standing out, and these individuals try to distinguish themselves through their views on life," Kovalенко explained.

Nonetheless, the primary motivation remains – money. A young man without an income, or a repeatedly convicted man with a drug addiction, types something like "How to quickly make money?" into a search engine, making him a target audience for such advertisements. It won’t be long before he stumbles upon a Telegram group that promises money for simple tasks. Tasks could include posting flyers with a predetermined text, moving a package from one location to another, or entering a military recruitment center to leave a box at the reception desk.

Each task, depending on its complexity, is compensated – with promises ranging from $300 to $3,500. The initial "easy" money is typically received by the performer. The curator understands that they have a hook in this individual and offers a more challenging task, albeit with a higher payout. A key aspect of the profile of the average bomber is that appealing to their patriotic feelings is entirely futile.

"If one tries to reach out to these individuals, calling for patriotism, for being 'pro-Ukrainian' – it’s pointless because they think in material terms. They can only be frightened by the loss of life and the realization that they will be deceived and not receive their payment. That’s how one can reach them; all values, patriotism – that’s absent," Kovalенко added.

Agent network

Any act of sabotage involves more than just one bomber. There is a person who manufactures the explosive device, someone who hides it, a person who moves it, and then finally, the actual executor. This scheme closely resembles the workings of any drug cartel, where there are manufacturers,