Wednesday22 January 2025
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Can Ukraine stabilize the front soon, and what lies ahead for the war?

Starting from the new year, Russia has intensified its assaults across multiple fronts. Currently, its main focus is the battle for Pokrovsk and the push to drive Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region. Can the Defense Forces halt the advance of the occupiers and stabilize the front lines? This is explored in the analysis by military-political observer Ulyana Bespalko for RBC-Ukraine.
Сможет ли Украина в скором времени стабилизировать фронт и как будут развиваться события в войне?

Since the beginning of the year, Russia has intensified assaults in several directions, with its current priority being the battle for Pokrovsk and the expulsion of Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region. Are the Defense Forces capable of halting the advance of the occupiers and stabilizing the front? This is addressed by military and political analyst Ulyana Bespal'ko from RBK-Ukraine.

 

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At the beginning of the year, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the task of the Defense Forces in January is to stabilize the front. According to him, this is achievable through the training of new military personnel and the arrival of new weaponry.

The stabilization of the front is also being discussed by Donald Trump's team. Mike Waltz, whom the elected U.S. president plans to appoint as his national security advisor, calls this a necessary condition for reaching a peace agreement with Russia.

However, currently, Ukrainian troops are managing to hold off the occupiers only in certain areas, while the enemy is advancing on eight fronts and preparing for the main battle of the upcoming months.

Russia has intensified assaults and attacks

The fall of Ugledar in October last year severely worsened the position of our troops across the entire southern part of the Donetsk region. One enemy group from Ugledar moved north to assist in capturing Kurakhovo, while another turned west to advance on Velyka Novosilka.

In December, Russian forces approached Velyka Novosilka from the north and east, and by the start of this year, they likely reached the southern outskirts of the city, having captured the village of Neskuchne.

Recently, the occupiers also completed the capture of Kurakhovo. Currently, Ukrainian units maintain control over a small bulge near the settlement of Dachne, which is to the west of Kurakhovo. However, it is very likely that our troops will have to retreat from there to Konstantinopil due to the threat of encirclement.

As previously predicted by RBK-Ukraine, resolving the "issue" of Kurakhovo allowed the Russians to shift their focus to Pokrovsk. Their goal is to create an operational encirclement around the city.

The Russian advance on Pokrovsk (map: DeepState)

The timing of the battle directly for Pokrovsk now depends not so much on the Russians, but on the resilience of our troops in this direction. Many anticipated the loss of this city by the end of September, yet the occupiers remain at least four kilometers away from it. It is evident that the Pokrovsk area will become the epicenter of battles in the coming months.

To the south of this city, the occupiers have cut off the road to Mezhevaya. This is one of two roads connecting Pokrovsk with Dnipropetrovsk region. Additionally, the enemy seems to be planning to cut off the second route leading to Pavlograd and approach Pokrovsk from the west as well.

At the beginning of the year, the adversary also activated the right flank of its grouping in the Pokrovsk direction, where it began to break through to the T0504 road (Pokrovsk - Konstantinovka) near Vozdvizhenska. According to reports, one column of the sabotage and reconnaissance group recently managed to reach this road but was destroyed. Although T0504 is no longer used to supply Pokrovsk, physical control over this route will open the way for the occupiers to the northeastern outskirts of the city.

Access to this road creates risks for another defense node of the Ukrainian troops in Donbas – Konstantinovka. This city, in turn, stands on the aggressor's path to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. The battles for Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupiansk, and Lyman are part of this same plan – creating conditions for the occupation of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.

In both Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, the situation has noticeably worsened in recent weeks. The Russians have captured most of the territory of the Toretsk agglomeration. In the city itself, Ukrainian units continue to hold the defense on several spoil tips. In the event of the complete occupation of Toretsk, the enemy will be able to advance towards both Konstantinovka and north towards Chasiv Yar.

There, the Russians have managed to capture the Severny microdistrict in recent weeks and advance into the territory of the fire-resistant plant. Ukrainian forces maintain control over the central and southern parts of the city.

In the Kupiansk direction, the enemy's army continues to advance broadly towards the Oskil River. The adversary has managed to establish a foothold on the right bank of the river, from where it, along with its "left bank" grouping, plans to advance on Kupiansk. Greater success has been achieved by the enemy further south, in the area of the Zherebets River, where they have breached our defenses near Ivanivka and reached the western bank of this river.

Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration (map: DeepState)

The enemy's further goals here include advancing on Terny, Torske, and Lyman. A more global plan involves establishing control over the entire northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets, starting from at least the point where the Oskil flows into it. From there, they aim to move towards Slovyansk. Currently, this does not seem to pose an immediate threat.

The situation in the Kursk region and what lies ahead

In the Kursk region, the enemy has also begun the fourth phase of its assault to push the Armed Forces of Ukraine away from there. This phase has proven to be more successful for them than all previous attempts. Not least due to the participation of North Korean soldiers. Enemy forces are pressuring our foothold nearly along the entire perimeter of the "Kursk front." In recent weeks, the Russians have managed to regain control over Novoivanivka and approach Makhnivka, which is just 2 kilometers east of Sudzha. All these actions have one goal – to force Ukrainian troops to shorten the front line by compressing this foothold.

In the first days of January, the Defense Forces also attempted a new offensive in the Kursk region, striking towards the Berdyn farm. According to reports, Ukrainian military forces were to advance with small numbers towards Bolshoye Soldatskoye – where the enemy's logistics and command points are concentrated in the Kursk region.

Ukraine is interested in holding onto Russian territory until negotiations begin. This is why, as informed sources explain, the goal of this offensive was to distract enemy units from other directions of the "Kursk front," thereby weakening their pressure there. However, having advanced a few kilometers in the Berdyn area, our military was forced to retreat due to fierce enemy resistance.

The road leading from Sudzha to Sumy (map: DeepState)

The inability of Russia to liberate the Kursk region within the established timeframe and the upcoming battle for Pokrovsk has compelled Moscow to adjust its plans concerning the Zaporizhzhia region and Kherson.

Several sources from RBK-Ukraine within the Defense Forces assert that the Russians have not yet abandoned offensive actions in the South but have been forced to postpone them for a while due to a lack of personnel, as well as the fact that Ukrainian forces are prepared to "greet" them there. According to RBK-Ukraine information, some forces from the Russian Armed Forces "Dnipro" (responsible for the left bank of Kherson and part of the Zaporizhzhia region) have been redeployed to the Kursk region and the Pokrovsk area.

A chain of interconnected problems – recruiting unmotivated soldiers, often inadequate training of recruits, and at times chaotic management of units "in the field" – prevents Ukraine from turning the situation to its advantage. The tactics of small assault groups combined with a swarm of FPV drones and countless drops of guided aerial bombs allow the enemy to destroy our defenses and gradually advance.

However, the Russians are also facing difficulties. Moscow is failing to translate its resource advantage into operational breakthroughs at the front. At the current pace of advancement, Russia could hypothetically occupy the entire Donetsk region by the end of 2025. But alongside this, there are significant doubts about whether the enemy can maintain this momentum. And if they can – will they ultimately have the personnel and resources to continue fighting?

The strategy of attrition that Moscow is following works both ways. If Russia chooses to continue the war and rejects the "peacekeeping" efforts of the U.S. – will its territorial gains in 2025 justify the onslaught of financial and economic problems it will inevitably face in 2026? Moreover, Washington has tools to exacerbate these