Five war scenarios: What to expect on the front lines in 2025 and are negotiations with Russia possible?

For over a year, Russia has been conducting an offensive campaign on the front. Meanwhile, Western leaders are increasingly calling for negotiations and an end to the war. The newly elected U.S. president stated even before his inauguration that he would be able to achieve this. What will happen with the war in 2025 is discussed in detail by military-political observer Ulyana Bespalko from RBK-Ukraine.

The war in 2024 has not unfolded in favor of Ukraine. A slowdown in assistance from the main ally – the United States – along with issues within the troops has hindered the ability to withstand Russia's pressure. Moscow has been conducting an offensive operation for over a year and is making gradual advances.

Statements from Western leaders and our officials suggest, either directly or indirectly, that the war is perhaps closer to a climax than ever before – it may have already begun. However, it may not resemble what many of us anticipated in 2022 or even in 2023.

What to Expect in the Coming Months

Russia is currently focusing its efforts on capturing the southern part of the Donetsk region – an area where the occupying forces achieved their most significant breakthrough in a year and a half after seizing Avdiivka. The heaviest fighting is occurring in the vicinity of Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove.

The first area, from which Ukrainian forces advanced during the counteroffensive in 2023, is now in a semi-encirclement. North of Velyka Novosilka, the Russians have cut off two roads leading from the city. To the south, the occupiers have regained control over parts of the settlements along the Mokri Yaly River, which Ukrainian troops liberated in 2023. Concurrently, our units defending in the village of Makarivka are under threat of encirclement.

Kurakhove, a critical defense hub for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the southern Donetsk region, is almost under the aggressor's control, except for the territory of the Kurakhivska Thermal Power Plant. The situation is also complicated to the south, in the so-called Kurakhove "pocket."

If Kurakhove falls, the enemy's focus is likely to shift to Pokrovsk. The nearest enemy positions from this city are located six kilometers to the south and east. In the coming months, the occupiers will concentrate on approaching this city from the north, from the vicinity of Hrodovka, and possibly from the southwest, creating conditions for a semi-encirclement of the city. Only after that will the Russians proceed to frontal assaults.

Two other challenging areas are the regions of Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, where fighting has been ongoing for several months. Capturing these two cities fits into the enemy's plan for the occupation of the northern part of the Donetsk region. Should Toretsk and Chasiv Yar be occupied, these two enemy groupings will set their sights on Konstantynivka, and afterwards, on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. However, the operation to seize this area is still in its early stages.

For the occupation of this agglomeration, the Russians need to "resolve" several complex tasks north of it. The first task is to capture the entire left bank of the Oskil River in the Kupiansk direction, from where the enemy could advance south along the river with a covered flank. A month ago, the enemy broke through to the banks of the Oskil, but since then, they have been unable to expand this incursion under our troops' counterattacks.

The second unresolved task for the aggressor is to secure a foothold in the area of Sviatohirsk and Lyman, from which they had intended to advance on Sloviansk in 2022 but lost control during our counteroffensive in the fall of that year. The third obstacle for the Russians is the existence of our Siverskyi Donets salient, which can still be considered the most stable section of the front, although there have been some recent upticks in enemy attacks there. Thus, battles for the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration do not currently appear to be imminent.

A separate foothold where complex battles are also taking place is in the Kursk region. Russian and North Korean troops are attacking this area from different directions: from the northwest, northeast, and southeast. North Korean soldiers have managed to approach Mala Lokna and break into Plekhovo, a feat that Russian units had not accomplished before. Overall, according to the publication, our military currently controls 45% of the territory in the Kursk region that they held at the peak. The deadline set by the Kremlin for the complete expulsion of the Ukrainian army is March 1.

Two other areas in southern Ukraine remain threatening, as previously reported by RBK-Ukraine. Several informed sources from the publication confirmed that Moscow has not abandoned the idea of launching an offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region and moving towards Kherson. Moreover, according to their statements, the enemy's readiness to initiate action on the right bank of Kherson is higher than for activation in Zaporizhzhia.

Our military anticipates that the main strike here may fall on the Pyatykhatky area parallel to the Dnipro – this is the area of responsibility for the enemy group "Dnipro." However, they do not rule out enemy actions near Huliaipole. As for Kherson, which also falls under the "Dnipro" group, the occupiers have already attempted to initiate actions towards the right bank of the Dnipro. The latest attempt occurred last week when Russian DRGs attempted to break through to the Antonivskyi Bridge from the direction of Oleshky. These attempts were repelled.

Sources from the publication indicate that a decision on offensive actions in Kherson has already been made. This operation will be overseen by the commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, Mikhail Teplinsky. According to RBK-Ukraine, about 4,000 stormtroopers may be involved in the offensive actions. This includes, in particular, the 61st Separate Marine Brigade of the Russian Federation, as well as airborne troops, such as the 7th Airborne Assault Division. It is symbolic that it was the paratroopers who retreated from Kherson in the fall of 2022. The attacks may come from two directions: one to the north, near Nova Kakhovka, and the other to the south of Kherson.

The onset of active actions by the occupiers directly depends on the weather and the success of Russian operations in the Kursk region. To move towards Kherson, the occupiers need to cross the Dnipro in one way or another. There are no surviving bridges there. Thus, they will have to cross the river using boats or set up crossings. However, in certain sections of the Dnipro, after the aggressor blew up the Kakhovka HPP, a continuous swamp has formed, which freezes in cold weather, making passage easier. This is also known to the enemy.

Secondly, part of the airborne troops from the "Dnipro" group has been redeployed to assist Russian units in the Kursk region and has not yet returned from there. Sources from the publication express doubts about the success of Moscow's plans, considering the complexity of such an operation and the fact that the occupiers are already prepared to meet them on the right bank.

Five Scenarios for the War in 2025

Russia's current plan is to advance wherever possible. Ukraine, for both objective and subjective reasons, is unable to stop the enemy's pace or seize the initiative on the front. Currently, all trends indicate that we will not be able to turn the situation in our favor in the near future.

Most, if not all, Western leaders seem to doubt the possibility of regaining all our territories through military means and are increasingly calling for peaceful negotiations with Russia. This idea is being articulated clearly at the forefront by Donald Trump and his team. In reality, the future of the war now rests primarily in the hands of the United States. And while there has yet to be a clear strategy from the U.S. regarding the cessation of hostilities, there is no doubt that immediately after the inauguration, the new White House team will actively engage in the "peace process."

Ukrainian authorities have already begun to cautiously speak about the impossibility of regaining all occupied territories through force. The question of waging war until reaching the internationally recognized Ukrainian borders of 1991 has disappeared from their public rhetoric.

Similarly, cautious statements about readiness for negotiations have begun to emerge from Ukrainian officials. At least, following a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Donald Trump stated that Zelensky is ready to conclude an agreement to end the war. It can be assumed that this implies agreement to certain compromises, considering that Ukraine is currently not in the best position. The exact nature of these compromises will be determined directly during negotiations. Zelensky, in turn, after his meeting with Trump, stated that Ukraine needs a just peace and strong security guarantees that would prevent Russia from returning to war.

Three other significant factors remain unknown: first, what security guarantees Ukraine might receive in the event of a