Friday27 December 2024
ukr-mafia.com

Mikhail Podolyak: Trump seeks quick solutions, but we cannot end the war according to Putin's script.

The newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump is seeking immediate solutions to expedite the end of the Russia-Ukraine war. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin aims to "reset" the reputation of the United States and is unlikely to agree to European peacekeepers without pressure. This was shared by Mykhailo Podolyak, an advisor to the President's Office, in an interview with the YouTube channel RBK-Ukraine.
Михаил Подоляк: Трамп стремится к быстрому разрешению, но нельзя завершать войну по плану Путина.

The newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump desires immediate solutions that would bring an end to the Russian-Ukrainian war. In contrast, Vladimir Putin aims to "reset" the reputation of the United States and will not agree to European peacekeepers without pressure. This was stated by Mikhail Podolyak, an advisor to the President's Office, in an interview with the YouTube channel RBC-Ukraine.

On Zelensky's meeting with Trump and whether the end of the war with Russia is near

(All publications regarding the meeting with Trump are being reported through Western media citing anonymous sources. Therefore, this has little to do with how the process will unfold moving forward.)

It is possible to immediately cease fire. However, this would mean encouraging Russia to continue its expansion at Ukraine’s expense during a transitional phase, as they build up resources. This is because Russia has not achieved the objectives it set for itself. These objectives are much broader than merely capturing parts of Donetsk or Luhansk regions.

There are no official proposals on how to end the war. Apart from the official positions of Ukraine and Russia.

Russia, through Lavrov, Peskov, and Putin, states that they want to acquire four regions. They seek Ukraine's renunciation not just of NATO, but of its army and NATO weapons. They want a small army with police functions, nothing more. Furthermore, they desire the dominance of Russian culture, language, and information space in Ukraine.

On the other hand, Ukraine’s position clearly states that the war cannot end at Ukraine's expense without undermining international law. Regarding security guarantees, the president speaks about this publicly. Not only must the war end with a legal context, but it must also be understood that if Russia is not decisively defeated and led to political transformation, it will always insist on its right to dominate through violence in Europe.

Ukraine does not want that. Ukraine wants to understand whether it has the right, like any other country, to be a member of a collective alliance. If NATO membership is not on the table, let's discuss how else to protect Ukraine's territory from Russian encroachments.

Trump is eager for immediate decisions that will be pro-American in terms of information impact. However, there is one nuance. You cannot end this war within Putin's scenario and think that you have concluded it. Because without pressuring Russia, this is Putin's scenario. It would be strange if the Trump administration wanted to play into Putin's hands.

Russia continues to use virtually all conventional weapons. However, it understands that it is impossible to defeat Ukraine in any sense. For Russia today, another context is important – the discrediting of the United States. To temporarily end the war in Ukraine on Russia's terms and demonstrate who the global leader is.

On the European Contact Group for Ukraine

The European alliance will form based on facts. Because one cannot pretend that there are no risks. These risks are generated by the Middle East, waves of migrants, Russian coups in Africa, and the war in Ukraine. The pressure on Europe is increasing. And here we need to move to a different concept of pan-European security architecture.

We see Poland's statements regarding its army's rearmament. How it is actively purchasing various types of weapons, air defense systems, aviation, and artillery. We observe a completely different rhetoric from France and Germany. This indicates a departure from the concept that Russia is an unconditional partner of Europe.

They understand that Ukraine's role will be much more substantial than it has been over the last 30 years prior to the full-scale invasion. Firstly, Ukraine is a subject; secondly, it possesses competencies that no other European country has – the readiness to resist any armed aggression.

And thus, such an alliance is possible. It mystifies me why the U.S. continues to consider itself a great nation if it abandons the promotion or protection of its values. I do not understand why other countries, for example, China, would build not an economic platform with BRICS but a political alliance that would exert pressure on global influence markets.

On the idea of France and Poland sending 40,000 peacekeepers to Ukraine

Negotiations (on ending the war) may begin in winter, but let's be frank – these will be negotiations about a certain freeze. However, these negotiations can only take place if you have tools to compel Russia. Because Russia, which threatens with a group strike "Orchard," proportional in strength to nuclear capabilities (as Putin constantly states), will not agree to any armed intermediaries in the conflict zone. Just as it did not agree to missions along the Georgia-Russia line.

Why should they agree if they believe they can continually pressure and seize additional territories? They will construct fortification lines and maintain 150,000 or 300,000 of their military in those territories. They will perceive this as a testing ground, for example, to advance towards the Dnieper over the next five years.

I do not understand why Russia, which is not being compelled to do anything, should voluntarily agree to a scenario where there are some 40,000 "intermediaries" who will prevent the realization of the creeping capture of Ukraine.

I appreciate the position of (Polish Prime Minister) Tusk. Given Poland's presidency in European institutions, it is preferable for them to have a firm stance in negotiations. However, the negotiation process itself, where ultimatum proposals will be on the table, and Russia will see all the demoralizing publications from Western countries and Ukraine... Why should we expect a positive or even neutral outcome from the negotiations?

On security guarantees without NATO membership

President Zelensky has a realistic view of the situation, offering the tools that are available. He states that if there is international law and a ready alliance with accumulated resources, there is no need to invent other tools that will not work or will be blocked at some stage.

What other security guarantees could be proposed? For me, this is "terra incognita." If you are not a member of an alliance, you can only voluntarily receive something if a certain country wishes to provide it. But if you are a potential or actual member of an alliance, then everything in the warehouses should be available for your defense. This is what security guarantees look like for countries like Ukraine in relation to Russia.

Russia only understands compulsion through force, and that is only through collective alliances. Therefore, I do not understand the discussions that we are not being invited to NATO, but at the same time, they are ready to send a 40,000-strong contingent. Either it is concrete – an invitation to NATO, demands on Russia, and a freeze – at least it is clear how it looks with the contingent. Or it is not. It cannot be that Russia insists on "no NATO, exercises, and weapons," but there will be a NATO peacekeeping contingent.

And there is a military component. It is necessary to stop outlining scenarios where, as Germany says, we need to be ready to fight against Russia in five years. Why do you want to fight against it? The invading Russian army of 2022 and the army today in Donbas look different. Today, Russia understands what a large war is and how to utilize resources. They are investing in modern types of warfare, employing combined attacks, building fortifications, and so on.

If the war continues, in five years, it will be a fundamentally different army. Why will Europe, which will have no experience of war, be able to confront it? Why bring it to that point? Today, it is still possible to decisively defeat Russia when there is weaponry in the warehouses.

Is there a conflict with the U.S. over Ukraine's refusal to mobilize from age 18?

No. Mobilizing from age 18 for what? So that, without receiving sufficiently advanced equipment, a person with small arms sits in a trench against KABs?

Ukraine is undergoing heavy mobilization processes. If Ukraine were saturated with weapons and training centers, then this would be a completely different physical, psychological preparation, and skills in using weapons. If we solve the problem of saturating with a parity amount of weapons, then changes in the mobilization process are possible. But to simply say "mobilize 18-year-olds and this will solve the issue of war" – that is nonsense.

There is no conflict here. There is a discussion that is brought into the public space, although it is an internal discussion at the military level. How is this supposed to resolve the issue of saturating Ukraine with the appropriate weapons in the public sphere?

On Putin's defeat in Syria and how it will affect Ukraine

Without a doubt, one can speak of Putin's defeat in Syria. For Russia, it was crucial to control Bashar al-Assad's regime. They made it impossible to use Syrian territory, for example, for the Qatar-Syria-Turkey-Southern Europe gas pipeline.

Moreover, the destabilization of the Middle East has generally diverted resources from Ukraine, primarily U.S. and U.K. resources. Additionally,