"The military alone won't be able to manage," says Myzhevikin, Hero of Ukraine and representative of the General Staff.

“We are facing mobilization”

You are a career tank commander, leading several tactical groups, and have been on the hottest fronts: liberating the Kyiv region, participating in the Bakhmut direction, and taking part in operations in Kharkiv and elsewhere. How do you find it in the General Staff? Do you miss fieldwork?”

Of course, it is very difficult to adjust, and there’s always a desire to return to a more comfortable and familiar environment, where there are tasks that you must accomplish, where it is much simpler. Where there are more ordinary people united by an idea, fighting for each other and trying to do what they can to save the lives of those around them.

How would you describe the current situation at the front? At what stage are we now? Because the Russians are advancing so rapidly that we seem to be losing village after village, city after city almost every day.

The situation is very challenging right now. And I wouldn't want to sugarcoat it. So that everyone — from young to old — understands that we cannot give up, thinking that someone will do something for someone else.

It’s difficult because, firstly, new people are coming into the army. Many do not even understand what is happening and how to behave in this new environment — during basic training, it’s hard to pass on knowledge acquired over months and years of service in the Armed Forces.

From my own experience, I can say that there will never be a situation where 100% of the personnel who join a military unit will be able to fight immediately.

Regarding the training of recruits: are there any changes being made, particularly in the training centers? We had a piece about the many problems, with recruits complaining about the low quality of training, the lack of instructors, including those with combat experience, the Soviet system of standards, and being assigned to various tasks. Is anything being done to address these issues?

Of course, we are making progress. Efforts and steps are always being taken to improve.

First and foremost, there must be feedback from the people undergoing basic training about the quality of their education, what they lack, and vice versa. They can directly reach out to the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, or through trust websites.

But does this really work?

Yes, it does. We receive a lot of inquiries, we respond, and we investigate why these problems arose.

As for what you mentioned… Let’s start with the insufficient number of instructors.

Currently, military units find it difficult to release personnel who are ready to be instructors. Because they lack personnel, and we are once again facing mobilization.

We cannot take people from a military unit until a sufficient number arrives as replacements and a certain “percentage” is established. Commanders are reluctant to part with experienced personnel, who form the backbone of any unit — whether it's a platoon, company, or battalion.

However, this process is happening to some extent — a procedure has been proposed to recruit personnel with combat experience who have been wounded and are unable to perform combat tasks into the training center.

You mentioned that instructors were recruited from civilians or those who fought in 2014. Again, there’s a problem, and many complain about their lack of combat experience. Immediately, these individuals are sent to gain combat experience in military units for at least three months. But then the number of instructors decreases again due to constant movement.

How many instructors are there now for every 100 recruits?

It varies in each training center. When the mobilization peak occurred, we had to increase the number of locations. At one point, one instructor was responsible for 10–12, sometimes up to 15 people, which is quite a lot.

When, by the way, was the peak of mobilization — after the mobilization law was passed?

Yes.

Was this peak sustained for several months?

Yes. At that time, we increased locations and created new ones to avoid concentrating personnel in one place. Because enemy reconnaissance is very effective. There are representatives, so to speak, of society who, recklessly or for money or due to their ideological beliefs, leak information to the enemy.

Ideally, there should be one instructor per squad. That’s seven people.

When you presented changes in the training of recruits, you mentioned that basic military training would increase from one month to one and a half months. But will this improve the quality of training? Or is the General Staff still unable to allow for more?

Undoubtedly, extending the duration will improve the quality of personnel training. However, the quality is also influenced by the instructor staff and the resources available to training centers.

Now there is more time for personnel preparation. This allows for the introduction of new topics and areas of study, relieving the program. Instead of working from morning until night without rest and then doing it again the next day, there’s an opportunity to spread the number of hours over the days. If needed (this depends on the pedagogical skills of the instructors), time for self-study will be allocated. Instructors should treat their students not as a fluctuating group but as their own unit.

Are the training centers currently adequately equipped?

Of course not. If they were adequately equipped, we wouldn’t be facing logistical issues or requests from commanders for additional resources to purchase items that enhance the training and material base. All of this needs to be increased and scaled up.

However, there is improvement — the problem is recognized, and attempts are being made to resolve it. For the next year, double the funding is already being allocated for training: if this year it was 400 million, for 2025 it will be nearly 900 million hryvnias.

Additionally, at the end of the year, questions are being worked out for all training centers, preparation centers, and reserve battalions. This involves purchasing equipment in various areas: “Starlinks,” radios, “Mavics,” FPV (complexes), computers, laptops, software, night vision devices.

There is support from the state, assistance from partners, public organizations, and funds. But I still maintain that it is not enough.

The adaptation course in brigades should be 15 days

How much time passes from training to sending mobilized individuals to the front? Basic training lasts a month and a half, and then, as you mentioned, there should be an adaptation course in the brigades. Is this really happening? We know many stories where unprepared fighters are sent to the front lines. Is it feasible for this adaptation period for recruits to be ensured in all brigades?

Everything is possible, and the military unit can independently extend or shorten this course depending on the situation.

It is very difficult to make any decision here. But the maximum that depends on the Armed Forces, and us, is to ensure training. From commanders and leaders, it is about adapting the personnel who have joined the military units.

Adaptation in military units should last 15 days. Some extend it longer.

Now, after the basic combined arms training program has been extended, the adaptation program has changed. It was recently approved. It details what adaptation should specifically entail and what the commander of the military unit needs to do.

What do you think should be done about the large number of SOCH in the army? According to our sources, this is about 100,000.

This number refers to the entire war, you mean. I don’t have that number, so I can’t tell you if it’s a large or huge number. Our Armed Forces number about a million.

Some military personnel end up in SOCH for various reasons. But a third of them come voluntarily and are ready to continue carrying out tasks, just in a different unit. There are several reasons influencing their decisions, which are more emotional.

Those who have decided deep down that this is not for them, that they were born to smell flowers and frolic in a field of daisies, while all other difficult decisions or actions to defend the state should be done by someone else — no matter how much you teach them, they will still say they are untrained, unprepared, and that they haven’t been provided for.

So, transfers are facilitated?

Yes. I know that special training units have been created to which people who have deserted from military units are returned and then redistributed.

“The military themselves cannot sustain this pace”

How do you view SOCH as a public step to attract attention, particularly regarding clear service terms? Should the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff communicate this narrative? Because clear timelines were promised after