What is the biggest challenge in this direction?
UABs are certainly the most complex issue. However, for the infantry on the front lines, it’s FPV. They work around the clock here. They restore some shelter, and it gets destroyed overnight — and this happens continuously. We have EW capabilities, but the enemy is not standing still. They are thinking about how to bypass these systems, trying new frequencies, meaning they are evolving significantly in this area.
I have seen that they have started using drones on fiber optics. This provides a completely different quality of imagery. The operator of such a drone can better locate targets. I believe this is a monumental breakthrough. We have also begun to use such drones. Again, a different EW system is required here.
The enemy's ultimate goal is to reach the Oskol River. They are communicating through all their channels that by the New Year, Russian troops must reach the river. However, I see that this is absolutely impossible before the New Year. In terms of personnel, they outnumber us by dozens. We are leveling the playing field with drones, detecting their equipment from as far as 20 kilometers before the line of combat engagement, and we start working against them.
It is more challenging with the infantry. There are ravines, thickets, and Russians are accumulating and moving through. They probe for the weakest spots, where they can only bring in equipment, where it cannot pass. There are many rivers, such as the Pyschanka, that equipment cannot cross. Crossings need to be made. The defense forces have long been aware of these locations, and nearly all fire damage has been calibrated.
What is your situation with shells and drones? Are they sufficient?
I believe the National Guard and volunteer organizations sufficiently provide drones. I wouldn’t say that we lack them. Shells, however, are a different issue. There are problems with certain calibers. The enemy, on the contrary, has no issues. We know they have no problems with 125mm tank shells, while our situation is somewhat different. The same goes for 120mm mines.
It is difficult to work with mortars when you have five different brands or five mines from various countries. The mines fly differently, making it very hard to calibrate. When you work with mines from a single manufacturer, you already know how they fly and how to work with them, what to take into account.
Regarding the supply of the Russians — I remember an interception where a gun commander at one firing position reports that he fired 10 shells, with 95 remaining. This is just for one day, at one firing position, not in the battalion's warehouses, but at a single position. Yes, we see what resources they have there, the reserves of all this.
Can you tell us about the captured Russians? What kind of people are they, what do they say?
In my experience, the overwhelming majority of Russian prisoners are ex-convicts; others complain about loans, family issues, stating they need to earn money. Some talk about their problems, that they are forced to come here from the zone, but we understand perfectly well that they came on their own. Some came for money, while others for ideology and propaganda, as theirs works much better than ours. I sometimes wonder: how are they all compelled to storm? They run after one another and perish, while those behind step over and continue running. Still, they attempt to reach the final point.
They have soldiers willing to walk 20 kilometers to the positions in this direction. They are dropped off in one settlement and walk for five days to the positions. They forget what evacuation, assistance, food, and water are. They walk along the road, gathering something, drinking water from rivers, yet they keep going and fulfilling assignments. For us, for example, the soldiers I know would find it a bit challenging to be tasked with: “Walk 20 kilometers, you’ll find something to eat somewhere in the settlement, and change into something else.”
There were prisoners we caught in huts. They were looking for warm clothes or something to eat.
What are the losses among the Russians here?
In this direction, during interceptions, they complain about suffering many losses, but at the same time, they are receiving many reinforcements. They all say it is hard to reach the positions, that artillery and drones are working against them. Yet, there are those who make it, and then the unit commander tells them over the radio: “Come on, welcome another six like that.” Three arrive, and they send him another six. Out of those six, two or three might make it. This is their accumulation system — they gather in these bushes and sit there, living like homeless people in those pits.
They have more options; they rotate. For us, it is somewhat more difficult to arrange any replacements or rotations. We try to do as much as we can, but a full rotation is very challenging. I cannot imagine how to remove a battalion from the direction and replace it with another battalion. That is quite a problem.
What could improve the situation in the Kupiansk direction?
Training of personnel on our side. Motivating them more to fulfill combat tasks. I think this would improve the situation. There is a category of military personnel, let’s not hide it, who are, to put it mildly, not very motivated to carry out tasks due to our losses of positions. People are afraid; some were not properly trained. The soldier of 2022 and 2024 is two different soldiers. Back then, people were ready to give their all to fulfill tasks. Now, they need to be coerced to put in the effort on tasks, and this difference significantly impacts the situation.
Do the people who come to you need additional training?
My entire battalion consists of mobilized individuals. Only 15% are contract servicemen. If there is free time, we definitely conduct additional training and shooting exercises. We teach shooting from various positions, while moving, and we add some physical load so they understand that shooting while lying down versus shooting while moving on the battlefield makes a difference in aiming, as your hands are not positioned the same, and your breathing gets disrupted.
We also try to conduct training sessions with the guys who have recently returned from the positions and can share details about being on the front lines — what countermeasures against drones or drops should be in place.
Sometimes, people do not understand what FPV or Mavic is and where it buzzes. They stop and look at it, and then it falls. An old warrior knows: if you hear that sound, you need to run and hide somewhere. On the positions, we send two experienced fighters and 4-6 newcomers who have just arrived in the battalion. The new people learn from the veterans how to behave in those realities.
The factor of the first battle plays a significant role because no matter how well you train, the first battle will reveal everything. I have seen people who performed poorly in training but after the first battle, when they effectively repelled a storm attack, they became some of the best fighters. Then there are those who performed well during training but were broken by the first battle, and they can no longer return to the positions. That is the main issue.
Therefore, we offer various positions. If a person is in the infantry and we see that they cannot morally fulfill the task, we suggest training for pilots, driving positions, BMP drivers, artillerymen, or mortarmen. We look for those who can dig well. Such individuals are also needed, as not just infantry can do everything, because everything is placed on their shoulders: the infantry fights, the infantry storms, the infantry secures positions, the infantry walks to the positions on foot, and the infantry carries water for themselves.
How do you think we can currently exit the situation happening at the front if the Russians continue to press forward, slowly, albeit with heavy losses?
Firstly, there needs to be some replacement in the cohesion of the regular units. A battalion should come in, not just one company from one unit and another from a different one. It becomes a patched-together mess: no interaction, no cohesion.
It is a problem when a battalion suffers losses and is replenished on the spot, like in my case. They send me new people, and I have to get to know them here on the battlefield. I would have liked to work with them before combat operations, to observe during exercises who might become a squad commander, who might be the platoon sergeant. But instead, I am getting to know them here, and there is little time to understand their leadership qualities and level of training.
If I could have