Commander of the 37th Marine Brigade, Sergey Shatalov: I see nothing wrong in retreating 150 meters.

At just 17 years old, Sergey decided he wanted to become an officer, despite not growing up in a pro-Ukrainian family. Currently, this combat officer holds the orders of "For Courage" III degree and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi III and II degree.

He joined the marine infantry in 2014, just as the units were withdrawing from Crimea. Since then, his entire military life has been associated with the marine beret, except for a brief period in 2021-2022 when he attended the U.S. Marine Corps School of Infantry.

After returning to Ukraine, he led a battalion that participated in the liberation of the Kherson region. This was followed by battles for Bakhmut. In Kleschiyivka, Shatalov was wounded in a small arms engagement in the forward trench. After his injury, the deputy commander of the 36th Independent Marine Brigade coordinated operations on the left bank of the Kherson region.

“The Russians have the initiative and a manpower advantage of 1:10”

You took command of the brigade in October, when it was entering the most challenging area — Kurakhivka. What was the situation like at that time?

The situation was difficult, as it is now. We were carrying out our mission with limited resources — without one battalion that was in Toretsk. Two headquarters battalions were not fully manned. Many attached units were completely destroyed and lost command. Therefore, in the initial phases, we managed to stabilize the situation and hold certain lines, which we have maintained to this day.

Why are the Russians able to advance here?

They have the initiative and a manpower advantage of at least 1:10.

What is their most successful tactic?

Assault groups (when the brigade is fully staffed, consisting of 10-15 people) carry out assault actions on each position. Typically, this occurs in bad weather, like fog, when we cannot conduct normal aerial reconnaissance. With this mass, they are able, in some cases, to capture or destroy our positions. We withdraw, and they secure themselves.

If they cannot capture a position through mass, they use armored vehicles or automotive equipment, such as buggies, motorcycles, or modified "sevens" and "tablets." This way, they infiltrate our combat formations and establish themselves somewhere in the rear.

Soldiers remaining at the front panic, leading to a loss of command. They either cut off our logistics and communication lines, causing us to retreat. If that doesn't work, they use UAVs and artillery. I wouldn't say they currently have an advantage [in shells] as they did before, but we may have parity.

Do you feel here that the Russians are endless?

I see that. In two months, three brigades have changed in front of me. They were either destroyed or brought to a state where they cannot continue offensive actions because we found documents from artillerymen and cooks, meaning it was clear there was no infantry left. The brigade we initially defeated has already managed to recover and has come back reinforced.

What do you think about the "Uspenivsky bag"? What role did it play?

I think there was no "Uspenivsky bag"; it existed only in the minds of journalists and incompetent military observers, I would say. At the moment the Russians entered, there were minimal personnel present, and the deceased did not die encircled but directly in contact with the enemy because our troop withdrawal to a safe line was well planned.

Yes, we certainly suffered losses, but if we keep retreating, we will retreat to Kyiv, stand on Bankova, and defend ourselves there.

“We dug a defensive line for the enemy”

You mentioned that when you arrived here, you had attached units. How difficult is it to coordinate the units?

It's not difficult. It depends on the commanders of the brigades and battalions. If you are given a battalion that should have 800 soldiers according to the staff, but there are only 202 and 10 infantrymen on the list, how many positions can I set up? One or two?

At one point, I refused the attached unit because I realized I was losing command. I couldn't manage that unit effectively. I waited for my second battalion to return from Toretsk, and we established our assault units for defense. Although we were not even 50% manned.

How do you feel about the practice of splitting a brigade and having its battalions fight in different locations?

I am against this practice, but I think it is important to understand who we are up against, what kind of machine this is, and how powerful it is. It means we had to close some gaps somewhere. That's why we decided to pull a battalion and cover a direction.

When so many brigades and attached units are fighting in the Kurakhivka and Pokrovsk directions, can they fight effectively and interact?

No, they cannot. A brigade cannot fight when it is only 34% manned on such a defensive line. There are fresh brigades coming in, but motivation is not quite right there. The personnel are not motivated to fight. Is this a question for the brigade commander? I don't think so, to be honest. I don't believe that a brigade or battalion commander can motivate 100% of the brigade to go forward into battle in a short time.

Was a defensive line prepared when you arrived here?

Yes, it was, and it is still prepared. The problem is not with the defensive line. The problem is that we dug a defensive line for the enemy. I need 30 soldiers to place in each dugout, but I only have five or seven. They cannot effectively control the entire platoon stronghold. Meanwhile, the enemy can enter from the left with 20 soldiers and occupy four trenches at once.

Our defensive line is very well planned. Everyone is fully prepared for circular defense; there are anti-tank ditches. Everything is there — just not enough personnel.

“Commanders are made scapegoats with millions of investigations”

Have you ever had instances where adjacent units did not report a loss of position?

Personally, I have not experienced this.

How significant do you think this issue is now?

In some directions, I think there are such problems. It depends on the conscience of each commander on the ground. Personally, if I lost a position, I would immediately call and say: “I lost the position; it is currently under my fire control. At 5:00 AM, I will try to bring people in.” At 5:00, I brought people in. I called the neighboring brigade commander and said: “My people are there; all is good” or “I couldn't bring them in; the position is lost; all is good.”

What does the higher command say when a position cannot be regained?

They say a lot. I understand the higher command. The brigade commander is responsible for the sector, right? 100 meters, 30 or 25 meters will not affect the overall situation on the battlefield. Therefore, I don't see anything criminal in retreating 150 meters (not 150 kilometers, of course).

If we are to consider jurisprudence or accountability, unfortunately, it turns commanders into scapegoats with millions of investigations in their pockets.

Are there any investigations against you?

Let's skip this moment. Confidential information (smiles - ed.).

“Among brigade commanders, there are amateurs in positions who do not understand what is happening”

We are currently seeing a practice where commanders frequently change in some brigades because they cannot hold a section of the front. How does this affect the brigade?

It's like, for example, a football team. They are the favorites in some league for the next season. They made many transfers, secured the best sports contracts, and a lot is expected from them, right?

But the next season, they start to completely fail. At that moment, the club management changes the coach and his coaching staff. Very similar situations are occurring here.

I am not saying that we are all being removed, and no one among the brigade commanders is to blame. There are amateurs in positions who do not understand what is happening: why there are so many casualties and losses, and how the enemy is advancing. There is guilt among the people, and something needs to be done about this situation. An incorrect decision has not been made.

Do brigade commanders fear reporting information about the loss of a position upwards?

I think they do.