All of this is due to the fact that the Ministry of Defense suddenly decided in December 2024 to change the regulations of its procurement agencies — State Operator of Logistics (GOLT) and the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA). Anti-corruption officials considered this unambiguously: a path to manual control. In fact, the minister — bypassing the Supervisory Boards — granted himself the right to dismiss officials if he sees “national security threats.” However, what specific threats were not specified.
“Such changes were made to almost all strategic enterprises. This is a requirement of the law on state property,” Deputy Minister of Defense Dmitry Klimenko informs several dozen people in the hall. However, his arguments were “debunked” by the initiators of the very law.
“How could you take one provision and disregard another from the same law — regarding the powers of the Supervisory Boards? That’s illegal!” Radina insists.
This story has raised doubts, especially since one of the leaders, namely the head of the Defense Procurement Agency Marina Bezrukova, is soon to have her contract expire. Whether to extend it or not — this decision should be made solely by the Supervisory Board of this agency. It seems that the already tense relations between the DPA and the Ministry of Defense have reached a peak. Now the question is whether Bezrukova will retain her position.
In an interview with hromadske, Marina Bezrukova discusses the threats and scandals surrounding procurement, who may benefit from them, who is leaking documents, and whether there is a chance to “reconcile” with the Ministry of Defense.
I’ll start by saying that there have been discussions for several months about the tense relationship between the DPA and the Ministry of Defense. As far as I understand, it all began with the story of merging the Agency with the State Operator of Logistics. And now it feels like this tension has reached its zenith. The Ministry of Defense approved changes to the Agency’s regulations, effectively allowing itself to dismiss/appoint the head bypassing the Supervisory Board and issue direct instructions. As was mentioned in the committee, for many this has become an obvious signal that there is a desire to change the head of the DPA and interfere in its economic activities. Is this obvious to you as well?
I believe this is at least a clear signal that the changes in the regulations completely negate the original idea of the Agency's independence. Independence does not mean lack of oversight. I operate under the full control of the Ministry of Defense, which approves every contract of the agency and every advance payment.
I can say that the tension began earlier. It started when I refused to unjustifiably extend delivery times for a Ukrainian supplier. The very same supplier involved in the scandal concerning 120-mm mines. I refused to do this publicly, at a large meeting, because the supplier was missing delivery deadlines.
Am I correct in understanding that the Ministry of Defense insisted on extending the contract with this manufacturer? And how did the scandal with the defective mines end?
I will only say what I insisted on: if the supplier is capable of fulfilling the conditions of the signed contract, then let them supply. If they cannot — they should pay fines, and we will urgently buy from someone else.
The scandal ended with the Ministry of Defense conducting an audit of the defective mines. One of its outcomes will be some institutional changes within the Ministry. For now, I can only say that, as the audit established, there are no grounds to accuse the Agency of supplying poor-quality mines to the front.
I know for sure that I did everything possible before signing the contract to assess potential risks: I reached out to the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Strategic Industries, and the Ministry of Defense. It was clear to me from the start that there would be problems with this contract.
Regarding the changes in the Agency's regulations that have now come to light. Until now, the Ministry of Defense communicated and explained these changes solely as a compliance measure with the law. However, at the committee meeting, the First Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Gavrilyuk practically admitted that they actually had remarks, for instance, that not everything had been procured. What is unsatisfactory for the Ministry of Defense, and were there indeed any delays, non-deliveries, etc.?
Delays were indeed on the part of the supplier we discussed. Additionally, there were delays from STE (Specialized Export — ed.) and another Ukrainian supplier, but to a lesser extent.
Claims that we bought something not from the list or not everything from the list are false. I neither have the right nor the ability to buy anything not from the list; that’s manipulation. And it simply isn’t possible because every contract is checked by the Ministry of Defense for compliance with the list at the project stage.
Almost everything was purchased under the first priority of the list. The General Staff constantly has to make changes to the list and priorities — considering the situation at the front, planned operations, etc. If something in the list becomes impossible to purchase, it cannot be bought. We immediately inform about this.
This raises the last reproach from Deputy Ustinova, particularly about the fact that in November 2024, the DPA informed the General Staff that it would not be able to supply ammunition worth 25 billion hryvnias. Supposedly, there’s a huge problem with the non-use of funds and the non-delivery of promised shells to the army.
The Agency constantly sends letters to the General Staff suggesting changes to the list, considering the real supply situation: remove a certain number of billions from certain contracts and transfer them to others. Since budget obligations are registered under contracts, this means reserving funds with the treasury for a specific contract with a specific supplier. If we see that the supplier is unable to deliver on time, we remove that reservation and look for an alternative. For this, consent from the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense is needed. That’s all. A standard procedure. It’s just such a poor manipulation that I was even surprised.
There has never been a case where I wrote to the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff that we would not be able to supply goods worth 25 billion hryvnias.
If we talk about the situation described by Ms. Ustinova, the mentioned 25 billion is for goods that for a number of reasons could not be supplied by “Specialized Export,” and the Agency reached out to the General Staff with a proposal to redistribute these funds to avoid a supply failure.
Ustinova referred to a document from the acting head of the General Staff, which states the impossibility of fulfilling your government contracts for critical supplies. Are you saying it was taken out of context?
Absolutely. It’s a piece of the puzzle that was pulled out of the picture and another picture was drawn in its place.
By the way, I also heard about the non-utilization of your Agency's budget from the head of the procurement policy department of the Ministry of Defense, Gleb Kanevsky. As I understand it, the Ministry of Defense justifies its decision to take 23 billion hryvnias from the DPA budget and redirect it to border guards who purchased ammunition from a dubious Polish intermediary. What was that about, and how can you comment on it?
I can comment that these stories are not related. We wrote a letter proposing to redistribute funds from the failed contracts of “Specialized Export.” At the same time, we had contracts for critical nomenclature amounting to about 50 billion hryvnias, for which the Agency was supposed to make advance payments of 23 billion hryvnias. We held onto these 23 billion until the suppliers received all the necessary permits.
When the Ministry of Defense manipulated by saying that the Agency had 100 billion hryvnias in unused funds, at the time of the funds being withdrawn, there were actually even a little less than 23 billion — 21.8 billion hryvnias.
The week after these 23 billion hryvnias were taken and redistributed to the State Border Guard Service, the suppliers received their licenses. But there was no money left. I have many questions regarding how the